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ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF GRANT BACK CLAUSES
IN LICENSE AGREEMENTS
Sol M. Linowitz and George W. F. Simmonst
In the shifting sands of antitrust law, one area has during the past
ten years shown a refreshing degree of stability. This is the area marked
by the legal limits on the power of a licensor to require a grant back of
improvement patents. With increasing industrial dependence on research
and greater necessity for cross-licensing to permit effective exploitation
of new fields of technology, the problem is of growing significance to both
business and the Department of Justice.
The grant back clause is hardly a johnny-come-lately in the licensing
field. But while its use certainly antedates the Sherman Act1 the pos-
sibility that it might raise antitrust problems was not suggested frontally
until 1927 when a Texas state court held that a grant back clause in a
license was not illegal under the Sherman Act The first case to reach
the federal courts was Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co. There,
the court made short shrift of the question and upheld the legality of
such a clause without much discussion.
This, then, was the legal situation when in 1946 Stokes & Smith Co.
brought action against Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. to have a grant
back clause in a license declared invalid. The clause there required the
licensee to execute a complete assignment of all improvement patents to
the licensor.4
The district court upheld the clause; and on appeal the court of ap-
peals reversed by a split vote.' The rationale of the decision in the court
of appeals was Judge Hand's analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions
holding illegal the use of a patent monopoly to control an unpatented
product' or combination.7 Although no precedent bore directly on the
question before the court, the majority held that the judicial philosophy
of these decisions should properly extend to the situation where a piae p,
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 263, for biographical data.
1 See, e.g., Bunker v. Stevens, 26 Fed. 245 (C.CNJ. 1885).
2 American Refining Co. v. Gasoline Products Co., 294 S.W. 967 (Ter. Civ. App. 1927).
3 72 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1934).
4 The grant back clause read as follows: "If the Licensee shall discover or invent an
improvement which is applicable to the Transwrap Packaging Machine and suitable for
use in connection therewith and applicable to the making and dosing of the package, but
not to the filling nor to the contents of the package, it shall' submit the same to the
Licensor, which may, at its option, apply for Letters Patent covering the same." 156 F.2d
198, 199 (2d Cir. 1946).
5 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., 156 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1946).
6 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
7 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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license was conditioned on a grant back of improvement patents. Certio-
rari was thereupon granted by the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict
between the second and seventh circuits.
Thus, in 1947, in the Transparent-Wrap case the Supreme Court for
the first time laid down general rules and guideposts for determining
the validity of grant back clauses. Speaking for a five-to-four Court,
Justice Douglas held that such a clause was not per se illegal under the
antitrust laws.8
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that Congress had
made all patents assignable without any express or implied provision that
such assignment might be only for a specific type of consideration; that,
therefore, the licensor was free to assign part of his patent monopoly for
any consideration permitted by the law; and that such consideration
might be either money or any other species of property, including a
patentY Since in this case the licensor was exchanging one legal patent
monopoly for another, the combination of the two was not illegal, said
the Court, unless the over-all effect of the transaction was "to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." The case was
therefore remanded to the court of appeals to determine the effect of the
grant back on competition in the industry.
On remand, Judge Learned Hand found that there was no evidence
showing any unreasonable restraint of trade and held the agreement valid.
In his opinion upholding the grant back clause, Judge Hand specifically
dealt with the question of the double monopoly arising from (1) the
control by defendant of both plaintiff's and defendant's patents during
the period when the terms of the patents overlapped, and (2) the
temporal extension of the monopoly due to the longer unexpired terms
of the improvement patents. Since during the joint period no one could
make the patented device if defendant held either set of patents, he
pointed out, the fact that a possible competitor would be twice excluded
would have no practical effect on the market. As to the longer term of
defendaiat's monopoly, Judge Hand concluded, since the patents on the
improveme-At had issued and since someone obviously was entitled to
the monopoly for the patent period, there was nothing per se illegal in
having such ownership in the defendant rather than in the plaintiff.",
This balanced and reasonable analysis was made against the backdrop
8 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
9 The considerations prohibited by the Morton Salt case was the exchange of a legal
(patent) monopoly for an illegal monopoly (i.e., a monopoly in an unpatented commodity,
illegal under the Sherman Act).
10 Stokes & Smith Co. v Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., 161 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 837, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 787 (1947).
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of the Sherman Act which by its terms purports to prohibit absolutely
certain types of commercial behavior. Courts in recent years, however,
have been willing to read into the statutory language a required standard
of reasonableness-holding that only "'unreasonable" restraints are for-
bidden.1 While this "rule of reason" has had a weary up-hill fight in
certain areas, it has, since the Transparent-Wrap case, remained con-
sistently and firmly established in the field of grant back; and the doc-
trine there enunciated has been surprisingly free of subsequent judicial
erosion.
Thus, in Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels,,' Judge Monterelli sum-
marized the established view:
As to paragraph 6 of the agreement, [the grant-back clause] in a case
upholding a similar provision in a patent license agreement, the Supreme
Court held "that the inclusion in the license of the condition requiring the
licensee to assign improvement patents is not per se illegal and unenforce-
able." Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637, 648. Since in the case at bar there is no evidence whatsoever pertain-
ing to the effect that that provision in the agreement has had on the print-
ing on squeeze bottle industry, and since that provision is not per se illegal,
defendants' argument is without merit.'3
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. (Cellophane case).4 There, Judge Leahy stated:
This agreement contained provisions for licensing of certain future
patents, but these were drawn so as to limit both the number of patents
and the effect of any future licensing. DuPont was obligated only to
license those patents which related to moistureproof cellophane and to offer
them for licensing so long as the basic patents were in effect. In addi-
tion, duPont reserved right to charge additional royalty for significant
inventions and, in fact, made such charge in certain cases. Sylvania, on
the other hand, was obligated only to offer licenses to duPont under
patents which it might develop at a later date which fell within the field
of the basic moistureproof patent.
This grant-back, which in actual practice involved the licensing of only
nine patents, was within the rule most recently enunciated in Transparent-
11 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400-01 (1948). Judge
Hand phrased it this way in the Transparent-Wrap case: "It is hornbook law that not
every restraint of competition is 'unreasonable' and that only 'unreasonable' restraints are
unlawful." 161 F.2d at 567.
12 123 F. Supp. 426 (D.N.J. 1954), rev'd, 223 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1955) solely on other
grounds (invalidity of patent).
13 Id. at 433. The grant back clause in this case reads as follows: "Any improvement
made on apparatus or methods of printing which are the subject matter of this agreement,
by or through the efforts of the licensee or acquired by it, or which come under its control,
during the life of this agreement shall be the property of and properly assigned to the
licensor to the full extent of the interest therein of the licensee."
14 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The grant back provided (at
p. 151) for: "a license under any future patent granted to or acquired by Sylvania prior to
Oct. 6, 1948, where the inventions claimed were concerned with the manufacture of moisture-
proof cellophane and fell within the scope of the five recited patents." (The basic DuPont
patent in the license expired Oct. 6, 1948.)
1957]
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Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes and Smith Company, 329 U.S. 637 ....
The patents which duPont received from Sylvania under the agreement
in no way enhanced duPont's power as to moistureproof cellophane.
Sylvania could not have lawfully manufactured moistureproof cellophane
without a license. It used a number of the patents licensed under the
agreement, which enabled it better to compete with duPont. There is no
proof anyone ever requested a license under either duPont's patents or
Sylvania's patents to manufacture moistureproof cellophane and was re-
fused a license....
There is no decision which I could find, after long research, which holds
a license agreement such as the one involved here violates the Sherman
Act. Granting validity and scope of duPont's basic moistureproof patent, it
is difficult to show how duPont can be held to have restrained trade by
granting a license which permitted another to manufacture lawfully the
patented product, when there is no showing that as a result of the agree-
ment duPont's position was in any way enhanced or others who might
have desired a license were precluded from entering the field. Cases on
which plaintiff relies deal with combinations of patents under circum-
stances where the cross licensing parties sought to create a position of
market control beyond that which either of them was entitled to through
the exercise of its own patents. None of the cases affect legality of the
grant-back provisions of the Sylvania license under the tests stated by
Judge Hand in the Transparent-Wrap case.15
Several factors were cited by the court as decisive in favor of the
validity of the grant back clause: (1) There was no showing that any-
one was ever refused a license; (2) DuPont held the basic patents and
as no one could do anything without a license under these, it did not
matter that DuPont also obtained the improvement patents; (3) The
agreement was limited to moistureproof cellophane; and (4) DuPont
charged additional royalty for its improvement patents which were
later added to the license.
In the most recent case squarely involving the Transparent-Wrap doc-
trine, United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co., the
court held fast to the "Transwrap principle." There two companies
granted each other exclusive cross licenses of blocking and complemen-
tary patents so that each might make cooling beds. The defendants had
only a small portion of the cooling bed business and the companies were
not competitors but sold their beds in different markets. Although the
cross license was exclusive, it appeared that this merely ratified the pre-
existing competitive position between the companies. In reaching its
decision the court placed heavy reliance on the Lyophile-Cryochem case17
15 Id. at 224-26.
16 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Penn. 1956).
17 Lyophile-Cryochem Corp. v. Cutter Laboratories, 78 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1948),
modified, 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1949). Here two companies holding competing patents, but
not themselves competing, assigned their patents to a third corporation created by them as
a patent licensinz cororation. As the two patent comuaniPq owned the subsidiary, in effect
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and stated that the proper test for determining illegality was the "rule
of reason" set forth in the Gypsum case. Accordingly, since the Govern-
ment had shown neither the power nor an intent to exclude competitors
from the cooling bed industry, the court held that the Sherman Act was
not violated by the agreement.
Significantly, in the Birdsboro case, the Government laid great stress
on the provision in the cross license which automatically included future
patents. The court specifically held, however, that such an agreement
was not illegal per se'8 and distinguished the Line Material case' relied
upon by the Government on the ground that in that case there were addi-
tional elements (such as price fixing) present in the license which
rendered the agreement illegal when combined with the provision for
inclusion of future patents.
Obviously these decisions do not mean that the grant back clause has
become a favored child of the courts. Like all aspects of business be-
havior, it has its very real limitations and restrictions. Mr. Justice
Douglas indicated in the Transparent-Wrap case that other factors
combined with a grant back might well constitute a Sherman Act viola-
tion and cited the Hartford-Empire"° case as a classic example.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that since the Transparent-Wrap
case, several other courts have found a violation of the antitrust laws
in cases where a grant back clause has been accompanied by clearly
illegal restraints. Thus, in United States v. General Electric Co. (Ce-
mented Carbide case),21 the court held the existence of a clause requir-
ing licensees to assign all improvement patents to the licensor illegal
when the subject of the original license was a basic patent.22 The de-
fendant in that case, however, was also found guilty of clearly prohibited
conduct-price fixing and territorial allocation-specifically stated by
Mvir. Justice Douglas to be illegal when combined with the grant back.
Accordingly, while the court's opinion refers to the grant back provi-
sion as illegal in and of itself, the statement is manifestly dictum and
must be considered in the context of the total facts of the case.
A similar result was reached in another case a year later, also involv-
joint consent was necessary to grant a license. The court found no Sherman Act violation
as the companies tried to encourage the grant of licenses to all who wanted them and
quoted with approval a clause in the agreement indicating that their intent was to make
licenses freely available.
18 The court cited the Transparent-Wrap, Lyophile-Cryochem, and Cellophane cases.
19 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
20 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). In this case, the Court
found a regimentation of an entire industry with allocation of fields of operation, setting
-quotas, etc.
21 80 F. Supp. 989, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
22 In fact, though such assignments were offered to licensor, the licensor always refused
to accept.
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ing General Electric-United States v. General Electric Co. (Light
Bulb case) .23 There the court held a much more limited grant back
illegal. General Electric contended in that case that complete title
remained in the licensee, while it received merely a non-exclusive, royalty-
free license with a right to sublicense. The court dismissed the limited
nature of the grant back as immaterial since it was still sufficient to
render " impotent any possible advantages to which one of its licensees
would normally be entitled as the owner of a patent." The court found
that the grant back clause was part of a patent acquisition policy to
perpetuate control over light bulbs long after the expiration of the basic
patents and thereby regiment the entire industry.
On its face, this decision clearly is distinguishable from the Cellophane
case, for here the court found that an industry was being regimented
long after the expiration of the basic patents by a broad patent acquisi-
tion policy of which the grant back clause was but one instrumentality.
It should be noted, however, that in the Cellophane case DuPont would
be in precisely the same position as General Eleetric with respect to the
industry generally after the expiration of its basic patents and would also
own all improvement patents. The Transparent-Wrap case, however,
held such extension not to be per se objectionable and in the Cellophane
case the district court in Delaware refused to speculate on possible
future regimentation which might never occur.
Three years later, in United States v. I.C.I.,24 the court held a grant
back clause drafted in the very terms approved in the Transparent-
Wrap case to be illegal when used to help effect a division of territories
in restraint of trade. The patents involved were basic patents (on
polyethylene) but, significantly, the court did not rest its decision on
this alone as it had in the Cemented Carbide case four years earlier, but
rather on the combination of the grant back and the division of territories.
A like view was taken by the court in United States v. Associated
Patents, Inc.25 That case involved a patent pool among manufacturers
of machine tools in which the companies in the field assigned all inven-
tions to Associated Patents, Inc., a corporation organized by the defend-
ants as a patent holding company. Associated Patents, Inc., then granted
an exclusive license to each of the defendants for each of their specific
fields. The license required that all improvement patents be assigned to
Associated Patents, Inc. Here the court specifically found: "Invention
and technological development have been discouraged by the limitations
23 82 F. Supp. 753, 815 (D.NJ. 1949).
24 105 F. Supp. 215, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
25 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
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imposed on the members' rights to use and license improvement patents
developed by them." As a result of its findings, the court held the de-
fendants guilty of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. In this case,
however, it again appeared that the grant back was combined with an al-
location of territories, and it was also shown that the defendants had
refused licenses to competing firms in order to preserve their own
exclusiveness.
CONCLUSION
In the light of this analysis of the relevant decisions-and despite
occasional suggestions to the contrary-it is clear that in no case has a
court held a grant back clause to be in violation of the antitrust laws
when it was unaccompanied by illegal restraints. Nor is the question as
to whether the grant back is exclusive or non-exclusive determinative.20
The essential point is that where a grant back clause is part of a license
agreement which contains unlawful restrictions, a court is apt to find
that there has been forged a combination which is an illegal restraint of
trade; and, therefore, the combination-of which the grant back is a part
-will be struck down.27
Accordingly, if in a business arrangement a grant back is deemed to
be desirable as partial consideration for a patent license, there is no
compelling reason why a businessman should be more constrained to
forego such a provision than to surrender a cash royalty which may con-
stitute the remainder of the consideration. However, since a patent by its
very nature grants a legal monopoly and therefore constitutes an excep-
tion to the prohibition against monopolies, any patent license arrange-
ment will unquestionably be subject to ever closer scrutiny by both the
26 See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). Cf.
Report of Attorney General's Committee on the Anti-Trust Laws 228-29 (March 31, 1955):
If the grant back is a license, its reasonableness may depend in some circumstances
on whether the license is exclusive or non-exclusive. A grant back by assignment or
an exclusive license, which is in effect an assignment, should be subject to dose scrutiny
as a factor which may dull the grant back licensor's incentive to invent. On the
other hand, grant back of a non-exclusive license, especially with authority to sublicense,
may diffuse the benefits to all licensees and thus tend to encourage competitive use
of the innovations.
27 In an address to the New York State Bar Association in January, 1955, judge Stanley
Barnes, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice, set forth the following elements as leading to objectionable grant back
arrangements: (1) allocation of research; (2) pooling arrangements that might stifle
research; (3) anything frustrating independent exploitation of patents; and (4) joint action
in granting licenses plus a common litigation fund.
Substantially the same view was taken by the Attorney General's Committee on the Anti-
Trust Laws in its recent Report: "Summing up, in determining the legality of grant backs,
their purpose and effect is relevant; more particularly, what is their effect on (1) the
licensor's position as to patents or the products they cover, and (2) each party's incentive
to research." Report of Attorney General's Committee on the Anti-Trust Laws 229
(March 31, 1955).
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Department of Justice and the courts. And grant back clauses-since
they involve an exchange of patent monopolies-are apt to be doubly
sensitive. In short, while the grant back clause is a legal and tremendous-
ly valuable licensing tool, it is obviously one to be handled with circum-
spection and with due regard to the other provisions of the agreement of
which it is to be made a part.
